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The paper sets out to provide a consise systematic exposition of a rising euroscepticism in Croatia, giving particular attention to sources and conflicts that euroscepticism generate as well as to consequences that can or will occur. Sources of euroscepticism inside the academic youth are analyzed through the survey of student population. Results shows that students’ population are eurosceptical beause of economic cost they expect Croatia will have with the entrance in the EU (fear of poverty and exploitation of national resources, losing sovereignity and bigger emigration pressures). On the other side they also expect some positive influence of EU membership such as better employment possibilities, higher standard of living and more efficient state of law. 







Euroscepticism is a term that has in last few years winded around the territory of European Union, as well as the area to which EU is geographically related, i.e. the whole European territory. It is observed around two main questions: is euroscepticism part of integration process of Europe or is it a foundation for political, economic, social and cultural disintegration of the EU? Althought, euroscepticism is currently one of the most important issues in European discussions, this semanticaly adjusted historical and philosophic term has its source primary in political circles. Only in recent times euroscepticism is being analyzed on social and economic levels. Theological approach in defining and interpreting this dubious issue has historically also been a part of «European criticism». It is why this issue is needed to be sistematically approached from many different levels; from utterly utilitaristic approach on the one side to utterly demagogic point of view on the other side.
Beyond the euroscepticism and its forms, it is important to distinguish euroscepticism in the member states; scepticism that is related to the historical evolvement of the EU to the higher forms of integration which insist upon stronger connection and co-operation between the countries (usually it appears as a development of strong political tendencies - radical right, which are opposed to process of European integration) and euroscepticism in candidate countries which is far more complex. In transition countries, that were recently negotiating (or are currently in the process of negotiation), problem occurred not with the existence of one or two political parties that are opposing the entrance in the EU, but with the evolvement of so called “popular” euroscepticism whereas people become eurosceptical because of many reforms and uncertainty that the process brings. Candidate country needs to create institutional structure for the negotiations, gather around a group of experts in order to harmonize legislation with “acqui communitaire EU” and only then will people of a given country give the final decision “for or against” the entrance throughout the referendum. Closing of the negotiation in that manner does not mean that the country will enter in the EU. Though the rejection of the referendum was not a common practice in last two enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2007, history did show that people can be reluctant; paradigm was the rejection of referendum by the people of Switzerland and Norway. Emphasized discontent of the people with the situation in the country and the pressure by the EU for the acceleration of expensive reforms presents additional element of uncertainty about the entrance in the EU. In this manner it is so important to consider all source of euroscepticism in order to influence the rational perception of the EU, which is only possible by continuous propagation of quality information about the functioning of the EU as well as the importance of imposed reforms.
The aim of this research is to recognize forms (types) of euroscepticism and to determine does popular euroscepticism exists inside the Croatian society. Recent studies in Croatia showed negative attitudes of the people towards the membership in the EU which tend not to decrease, but it evolves in a rapid sense. Such a trend was noticed in the majority of the countries in their negotiation process. Lack of support was caused by many factors, but the most pronounced ones are: demanding and expensive reforms that must be put through, scarcity of the information about the EU, disappointment with the socio-economic standard and the current situation in the country and similar. After the theoretical part, emphasize will be given to the result of the study upon the students of the last year of undergraduate study at the Juraj Dobrila University of Pula about their stances towards the EU. In recursive way, result will show is academic youth eurosceptic or positively oriented towards the EU. The main and in a way hidden question is: are students in Croatia sceptical of potential membership in the Union and are they more/less sceptical in comparison to the rest of population. It will also be interesting to see if the results will differ from the recent studies in Croatia inasmuch as most of the interviewed students come from Istrian County; one of the most developed ones in the country, has the strongest collaboration network with the EU (involvement in many EU’s projects and programs). This paper is namely based on a survey which was conducted through the questionnaire, and the statistical methods were used in analysing the data. 

2.	Euroscepticism as a part of European integration process

The term euroscepticism refers to scepticism about European integration process, simultaneously relating to a conceptual conflict about organization and functioning of EU. It is common to relate the origin of the term with the name Margaret Tatcher who was the first to use and describe the word in 1986​[3]​. Importanly, the term has its roots in scepticism of British Conservative Party («political discourse») about membership in European Economic Community (EEC)- stand aloof from european integration process in 1950is and referendum on membership in 1975, opposing to the second wave of European integration during the 1980s and 1990s and opposing to European Monetary Union nowdays. (Baker et al. 1993, 1994, 2002; Aspinwall 2000; Gifford 2006, Daddow 2006).
The sources of euroscepticism vary from country to country (inside and outside the EU, inside and outside the integration proces), from party to party (radical left, conservative right, radical right, neoliberal right, neoconservative right, Communist parties...) and they vary even to extent of different population structure in some countries. The idea of euroscepticism is that it is opposed to everything that questions political, economic and social safety as well as sovereignty of one country and its people. Importance of this issue is seen through British scepticism towards the whole existence of EU, rejection of EU membership by Norway, «double rejection» by Denmark, «double rejection» by Ireland, etc. Irish «No» to Treaty of Lisbon is nothing else but a democratic legitimacy of euroscepticism at its work. Definitely, it is revealing that scepticism is a global trend which is rising from disbelief and suspicion in politics, politicians and national governments, whereas EU seems to be less promising, more distanced and more attractive for new eurosceptics.
Before carrying out the typology, it is necessary to clarify some formal, but also philosophical aspects of terms that are directly conditioned and limited by the term euroscepticism. Knowing the definition of euroscepticism, as an opposition, disapproval, antagonism and scepticism towards functioning of EU, person who embrace this ambition is called eurosceptic. Eurofobia is strongly related term that represents irrational fear towards the EU integration process (Milardović, 2007). As a reaction there are europhiles, eurooptimists and pro-europeans who support full integration on federative principles by reducing legislative power of national governments and by imposing stonger centralized rule in EU. Eurodogmatism arises from the «ultimate truth» that complete integration of EU is the only right path and the only truth. The followers of eurorealism are the ones that represent moderately and soft euroscepticism and are called eurorealists. Their aspiration is acknowledgement of people needs for personal (self-fulfillment, achievements…), domestic (workplace, family, friends…) and national («right of flag») sovereignty throughout freedom, responsibility and self-determination that belongs to current as well as future generation based on geographical, material, psychological, cultural, historical and traditional foundations. Since there is a talk about concept oppositions it is worth pointing out the contrarieties. Criticism is opposite to dogmatism, so it is immanent to scepticism. Idealism is beyond realism, and optimism is antithesis to pesimism. Therefor concept opposition of Euroscepticism looks like this:
                             EUROOPTIMISM		   EUROPESIMISM

	             EURODOGMATISM               	   EUROSCEPTICISM

                              EUROIDEALISM		   EUROREALISM

                                «Euro-opium group»            «Euro-reality group»

Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) are the first to distinguish euroscepticism on “soft” and “hard”:
a) hard euroscepticism; presents outright rejection of entire political and economic eurointegration process, opposition to their country joining or a desire for withdrawal of their country from the EU altogether. In reality it is a principled objection to the current form of European integration. In practice it is almost impossible to find hard euroscepticism in its true form, because it is too extreme. Although, this form presents pesimistic, even sarcastic point of view, it soundly suggests the core from which euroscepticism arises. In political structure of member countries or candidate countries there is no visible strong euroscepticism, or at least those eurosceptic parties do not have political strenght and votes to put it in the front line of political battle. Poland is the only country that has a hard eurosceptic party in its coalition government. 
b) soft eurscepticism; is a type of euroscepticism that is based on eurorealism. It is a kind of qualified opposition to European integration and can be divided in «Policy euroscepticism» (criticize EU politics, institutions, measures …) and «National interest euroscepticism» (criticize discrepancy of EU interest with national interests). Both sub-types do not imply opposition to integration on principled grounds (as hard euroscepticism) and in this way it is more certified term because it opposes certain policy for the sake of mantaining «status quo». Soft euroscepticism is a time and country specific phenomenom that depends on particular issues at stake in the given time and the particular stage of integration process (opposition to Euro, opposition to Treaties, opposition to Constitution, opposition to certain policy issues in CAP, nuclear power, etc) (Taggart& Szczerbiak, 2001). 
Kopecký and Mudde (2002) distinguished between ‘specific’ and ‘diffuse’ support for integration in the EU on the one hand, and for European integration in general on the other, leading to a 2_2 matrix on which party positions can be plotted and classified as: Euroenthusiastic, Europragmatistic, Eurosceptic or Euroreject. Flood (2002) has developed a six-point spectrum along which party positions towards the EU can be classified as ‘rejectionist’ through to ‘maximalist’.
The most interesting new typology gave Kaniok (2007). Analyzing definitions of eurosceptics, Europhiles and similar terms, by including positive and negative characteristics of  the EU, collecting fundamental documents of different parties programmes, analyzing pro-european supranational and federal models etc., Kaniok concluded that euroscepticism is one unstable category. In its core, new typology was based on factors of votings in the EU Parliament and on programme analysis. In this manner Kaniok categorizes three types of people stances toward EU: europeanists, eurosceptics and euro-governmentalists. With first two types we are familiar, but the interesting one is the third type. Euro-governmentalists have conceptual base in intergovernmental paradigm of the EU integration process with more reserved as well as critial guard towards today’s model of integration. One of their main stances of disapproval is lack of conviction of the necessity of building or identifying political entities such as European nation, new European identity, etc. From the perspective of political parties and their followers, it is worth pointing out that their «programme» is not built on the acceptance or opposition towards the idea of European integration process, but emphasises gradual process and implementation. Often it can be found that soft eurosceptics are included in this category. By analyzing the structure of European Parliament​[4]​ in terms of the programmes, in terms of voting attendance, in terms of the structure of their votes in EU Parliament and in interdependent correspondence with majority, Kaniok accentuate that euro-governmentalists are closer related to europeanists than to eurosceptics.
Though the term euroscepticism is polemically interesting to theory, it is still very hard to define sources of euroscepticism completely. Analyzing the term just from the philosophical perspective, problem is a paradigm of scepticism (Grgurev, 2005), therefor it is impossible to define directly sources of scepticism, in this case the sources of euroscepticism. 
Sorensen (2004) recognizes four different sources of euroscepticism: economic factors (material benefits that membership brings); fear of loosing national identity (sovereignty-        -based euroscepticism); fear of power in decision making (democratic euroscepticism) and politically related factors (which involves social aspect too), all which proved to be important substructure for up-raising euroscepticism in Denmark, France and UK. McLaren (2002) distinguishes economic, cultural and institutional factors and she finds little evidence that exclusive national identity affects perceptions of economic loss or vice-versa and concludes there may be two distinct paths to euroscepticism: one rooted in cultural threat, and one in perceived economic loss. Hooghe and Marks (2007) emphisized that euroscepticism emerges from the interplay between identity and economic interest. On the political right, euroscepticism is expressed in the criticism that the EU undermines national identity and national independence. Jacobs and Pollack (2004) were also exploring sources of euroscepticism (economic, social, political, religious, personal aspect etc.) and concluded that support for the EU is complex and it is based on more than just a calculation of short-term gains and losses. People in post-communist Europe link the EU not only with economic expectations but also with general political and social expectations. Milardović (2007) noticed some issues which have been embedded with the term euroscepticism: integration, sovereignty, national state, identity, neoliberalism, globalization, euro-federation, superstate, democracy and bureaucratism. First four issues are strongly connected and by determing each other, they interfear conceptionally with problems that brings euro-federation and superstate. Distinguishing characteristics between different countries confirme the hypothesis that there is no uniformed trend concerning euroscepticism. 
Academic scolars in EU often come to conclusion that the most common source of euroscepticism is mobilization of interest of those who support «status quo» (but it will be seen through this paper that euroscepticism raises from quite the opposite; it raises from relations which are interactively in contrariety, whereas constant process of integration is consider to be a new «status quo state»). The sources of euroscepticism in Scandinavia are directly connected to social and economic factors, where the sector of public opinion is afraid of liberalization, imposed rules and influence of the EU on welfare state. In UK, euroscepticism raises from strong patriotism. In new members of EU there is a fear of Western competition and dominance which has created strong antagonism towards the EU, especially in Poland. 

3.	Approaching EU – Euroscepticism and the experiences of EU new member states (NMS)














Support towards the entrance in the EU*(%)


*Figure shows only percentage of those who expressed positive stance towards the EU.
Source: Data available at Eurobarometer No. 66, 67, Candidate countries Eurobarometer March 2002, Spring 2003, 2004, Autumn 2006, Spring 2008.




Although initially considered that the entrance of Croatia into the EU will have a great support, initial enthusiasm turned to eurorationality. So the statements like this could «hold the ground»; «Discrediting Euroscepticism is like unconscious rejection of the critique towards EU policy and its acceptance as a kind of dogma» or «There is a temptation with most of Croatian politicians to accept actual political and economic concept of European Union as a universal value in which we all have to trust and which we all have to imitate» (Grgurev, 2005).
Euroscepticism arises from different points and problems. That is why some scientists have turned to indirect approach in order to explain the cause of this exclamation. At the beginning of Croatian independence there existed political party that was right-oriented and which had negative stance towards European integration because it ironically linked integration with the loss of just gotten independence. After 2000 and the beginning of a new co-operation with the EU, political or party-based euroscepticism disappears and today we can say that the whole political scene, generally is conciliated that the most important goal of Croatian international politics is the membership in the EU. However, with the signing of Stabilization and Association Agreement with EU and the starting of negotiation process, popular euroscepticism​[5]​ started to build up. 













Trends in support of Croatian membership in the EU from 2003 to 2008 Source: PULS, public opinion research agency.

Figure 2 presents the Croatian citizens' attitudes toward EU membership. It can be noticed that the support towards the entrance of Croatia in the EU was biggest in 2003 (82%), then it drastically fell in February 2005 at 44% after the SAA was brought into legislative force, to then be for a longer period around 50%. At the end of 2008 only 41% of Croatian people gave support to the integration process. Fall in support in 2008 could be caused by many rigid reforms that are imposed to Croatia. Example is Croatian shipbuilding; where there was talk about the rapid privatization and the sheer existence of that sector within Croatian economy. Namely, shipbuilding is the most important export industry in Croatia that has strong multiplicative effect on other industries and the whole economy, so that the deterioration of this sector would have multiple negative consequences on the employment and industrial production.  
 Result of Bagić and Šalinović (2006) study in a field of so called «general expectations» have shown that only 20% of Croatian citizens presume that the entrance in EU will bring them more benefits than harm. Only 20% think that there will be more benefits on national level. About 40% think that EU membership will bring them more harm than benefits in their private life and 46% think that EU will also bring harm to a whole nation. Byproduct of this kind of public opinion can be very dangerous for the integration process in Croatia. Analyzing the situation, Štulfoher (2006) gave few propositions that would have to act as a motivation factors in Croatia in order to form a direct strategy to combat euroscepticism. First, he noticed that there are many factors that affect the dynamics of euroscepticism, so it is impossible to create a single successful strategy for the reduction of euroscepticism in Croatia, and elsewhere. Second, nationalism and its socio-cultural, political and economic premises are major sources of distrust and reluctation towards the EU. Third, euroscepticism is also influenced by situational tendencies which are caused by party competition policy and large interventions in media. Fourth, the trust in the EU is formed through trust in national institutions, a fact no politician should forget. Fifth, recommendations based on these notions would be: increasing knowledge about EU of Croatian citizens, implementation of measures and policies that would increase trust in national instiutions and creating socio-cultural counterbalance to nationalism.
Particular issue of euroscepticism in Croatia is very comprehensive, similar to the situation in other parts of Europe. Conflict lines are directly confrontated and interwined which makes it even harder to find universal solution to fight euroscepticism, if that is in the end necessary. Euroscepticism could be just a factor of evolutional process of the EU. Throughout the ideological continuum of political sphere in Croatia there could be found traces of soft (radical left, conservative right) as well as hard euroscepticism (radical right), though it is very difficult to publicly name those parties eurosceptic because of their political and social involvement in the integration process. Consequences of euroscepticism in Croatia are evident in socio-economic, political and administrative changes that are occuring on the margins of society, whereas socio-economic factor seems to be the most important for the people.

5.	Analysis of academic youth’s attitudes towards the EU membership

Spajić-Vrkaš (2007) in her research of student population at the University of Zagreb and University of Rijeka came to conclusion that 40% of the interviewed students have positive attitudes towards the membership in the EU, though almost 33% of the whole sample is indecisive about that question. The main reasons for the entrance in the EU, as viewed by these students, are better standard of living and better employment possibilities and on the other side the major argument against the membership is exploitation of national wealth.




The research was done in January 2009 through the questionary, on the 200 students and in average only two students did not answer one of the questions in the survey, which is indeed a good result. The polling was conducted by the authors by the pre-agreed schedule visits to all study courses of all departments at the University. The authors explained the aim and the concept of survey, after which the students filled out questionnaires. Conceptual structure of the questionnaire enabled authors to uncover students general affective attitudes towards the EU an to show rational evalutation of a student mind set about socio-demographic, socio-economic and socio-cultural impact that EU has on Croatian people. Upon completion of the process of collecting survey questionnaires, data were entered into the computer and processed statistical program. Some aspects of descriptive statistics​[6]​ are presented in order to explain relations existing between the presented variables, though systematic  statistical analysis would request restructuring of the applied questionary, forming another set question that are more appropriate to the quantitative research then to a qualitative one. Scientifically said, it opens a wider scope for further research work in this field, namely different approaches in data analysis.
5.2.	Results

	Knowledge about the EU
One of the most important factors that form the people’s attitudes is their knowledge and acquaintance with the problem. Next figure shows that almost 60% of the students are well informed about EU which, if we pool second, third and fourth mark together, in fact brings us to about 95% of students whose knowledge about EU is in recursive way satisfying​[7]​. This means that students in their forming of attitudes and stances use all available information, which gives this study a solid ground for further analysis.

Figure 3
General knowledge about the EU





















Familiarity with the concept of EU


Source: Authors’ calculation based on the survey.

Figure 4. shows the level of satisfaction with the information that students could gather in their educational life. It can be noticed that there is a difference in satisfaction about the quality of information provided on high school level and faculty level, though in the end we can conclude that both on the high school level and faculty level satisfaction with presented information and knowledge too, is high enough. Those extreme cases (“Not al all” and “Yes very good”) in authors view are not statistically important, even though it could be in some way indication that everything is not so transparent, especially on high school level. 

	Sources of information about the EU
Educational life, schools and faculties are not the only sources of information about EU. The survey shows that 90% of students absorb information about EU provided by television, whereas about 70% use information from different newspapers and press. The power of mass-media in this sense is huge; nonetheless the influence of asymmetric information is often through this way abused. “Compulsory thinking”, lack of attitudes and juxtaposed stances are the end result if mass-media is used to spread misinformation. Internet is another influential mean which could be used to misinterpret actions, positions or trends, but it is also an important source of information that could not be found anywhere else. In this way it can form specific stances about specific issue, this time stances towards the EU. About 60% of students in this survey use internet to gather “trustworthy” information which in the end forms their stances and attitude towards the EU. About 20% of them use information given by their house members and friends, which shows that the issue of entrance of Croatia in the EU is a theme often spoken between members of family and friends. Other sources often used are: prospects, brochures, catalogues, bulletins and newsletters. Even though students were using a wide range of sources, a stance towards the quality and quantity of information is relatively divided. In other words, 50% of students think that the quality and quantity of provided information in Croatia about EU is good, or even very good, and 50% of them think that they are not good or not good at all. The access to quality information about the EU is one of the most important factors which tend to decrease eurosceptic tendencies that could evolve in candidate countries because it brings closer the people of those countries to the issues discussed inside the EU. Though, some past experience did show different trends​[8]​.

	Information about Istrian involvement in EU projects
The situation is even worse if we add the fact that the Istrian county is one of the most connected one with the EU through different association and participation in EU programmes and projects​[9]​. About 80% of students said that they are not satisfied with the level of information that they are getting about Istrian involvement in European trends. This is alarming fact that needs to be solved in near future. 

	Advantages and disadvantages of EU membership


















Advantages of the membership in the EU


Average: 1077,50	Standard deviation: 170,31	Variance: 29 004,70
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the survey

Figure 6
Disadvantages of the membership in the EU


Average: 1114,80	Standard deviation: 135,59	Variance: 18 383,70
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the survey.
	Support for the EU membership
In order to test stances towards the entrance in the EU i.e. the existence of euroscepticism, authors presented two type of question. First question needed to show the conformity about the entrance of Croatia in the EU. About 46% of students said they are not conformed to that, about 27% said they support the entrance and 27% were indecisive on the question. Despite the almost 50% of those who are against the entrance and are in a way eurosceptic, there are 27% of student that yet did not choose the side. The issue with indecisiveness shows that there is still a vast area for development of euroscepticism or europeism​[11]​. The second question did not leave students no space and they had to choose, are they in the manner they understand the issue, eurosceptics or europeists. Figure 7 shows the result. No less then 72% of students expressed themselves as eurosceptics and only five of them did not give answer. Similar to first question, the second question gave the same result: 25% were proclaimed themselves as those “for EU” or europeists. From the utilitaristic approach this could be seen as unexpected; this orientation classify young people as a group of privileged citizens, or so called transitional winners, because based on their adapted knowledge, skills and competence they should gain more through the eurointegration and in that way they should be more supportive​[12]​. The results of our analysis are in accordance with the results of public opinion research in the Istrian County which is part of the project Istria Communicating Europe conducted in accordance with the methodology of Eurobarometer (Debeljuh, et.al, 2009). According to that survey 44% of the Istrian County’s citizens support Croatia's accession to the EU, while in the age group from 14 to 25 years the support is only 35%. 

 Figure 7 
Stances towards the EU

        
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the survey.

If we look at regional dispersion of eurosceptic stances, we can note that 76% of students that come from the Istrian region are proclaimed eurosceptics, likewise only 66% of students that come from the continental part of Croatia expressed their eurosceptic stances​[13]​.  

Table 1
Stances towards the EU by the average income of students’ parents

Average income	Stance	Num.	%












Source: Authors’ calculation based on the survey







This research shows that the main sources of euroscepticism among students population are their perceived cost and benefits, whereas economic aspects have a bigger influence. In an idiosyncratic way we can conclude that distrust toward the EU as negative stance toward the possibility of gaining better socio-economic benefits creates strong euroscepticism in a student population. Simplified, students distrust feeds their euroscepticism. This statement is justified by the share fact of the students’ youth. Their acknowledgement of the issue is related only to specific economic benefits, whereas they do not realize wider aspect of the possible benefits or cost (advantages/disadvantages) as they only want a “breakthrough” in a world of grown-ups. Their economic expectation radically forms their stances where the prevailing benefits they expect are: better employment possibilities, higher standard of living and more efficient state of law. On the other side students have fear of poverty and exploitation of national resources, losing sovereignity and bigger emigration pressures if Croatia becomes an EU member. 
Čulig & Kufrin & Landripet (2007) found that people under 26 years of age are less optimistic about the membership of Croatia in the EU and tend to refuse their support to the entrance. In that way they are eurosceptics. That statement is strongly confirmed in this paper as 72% of students proclaimed themselves as eurosceptics. National identity shows not to be important factor of eurosceptic stances. But knowledge and awareness (presented through the variable of average family income, average students income and the level of parents education) about the EU shows to be an important factor as this study finds out that if people have quality information about the aims of the EU, they are less likely to be sceptical of European integration processes. There was found no correlation between the average grades and stances of students about the integration because 94% of students were in the middle ranking grades.
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Ovaj rad pruža sustavan pregled rasta euroskepticizma u Hrvatskoj, stavljajući posebnu pozornost na izvore i sukobe koji generira euroskepticizam kao i na posljedice koje mogu ili će se dogoditi. Izvori euroskepticizma akademske mladeži su analizirani kroz ankete na studentskoj populaciji. Rezultati pokazuju da je studentska populacija euroskeptična zbog ekonomskih troškova koje očekuju da će Hrvatska imati sa ulaskom u EU (strah od siromaštva i eksploatacije nacionalnih resursa, gubitak suvereniteta i većih pritisaka na iseljavanje). S druge strane oni  očekuju pozitivan utjecaj članstva u EU, kao što su bolje mogućnosti zapošljavanja, viši životni standard te učinkovitiju pravnu državu.
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^3	  She was famous for her statement "I want my money back" (at the European Council) and she succeed, amid fierce opposition, in drastically reducing Britain's contribution to the EC budget-UK-rebate mechanism of return of the funds paid into the EU budget (because the UK uses a few funds from the EU budget).
^4	  Finer distinciton between pro-european and anti-european parties was given by a hierarchy of terms: maximalists, reformists, gradualists, minimalists, revizionists and in the end rejectionists.
^5	  The term refers to a public opposition towards EU («Public Euroscepticism»). It is manifested through the results of referenda and statistical enquiry. Opposite term to Popular Euroscepticism is Party-based Euroscepticism. Taggart and Szczerbiak noted that the high level of Public Euroscepticism do not necessarily translate into high levels of support for eurosceptic parties and reversly high level of support for such parties do not necessarily indicates high level of Popular Euroscepticism.
^6	  Based on chi-square distribution.
^7	  students needed to rank their knowledge about the EU from 1-5, where 1 presented little or no knowledge and 5 presented excellent knowledge about the EU
^8	  Namely, in countries with better information and better chance of joining the EU support for entrance was not so strong and there evolved strong Euroscepticism, such in Poland and Czech Republic. European Commision study (2001) showed that Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia had less idealized view of the EU then Romania and Bulgaria who were farthes away from the EU but were more eager to get in the EU.
^9	  Alpe – Danube – Adriatic agency, Adriatic euro region and other projects together with some geographically and historically close countries like Italy and Slovenia.
^10	  This term is being recognized by Bo Bjurulf (2005) in his research of the causes of Euroscepticism.
^11	  Similar results were find with the question «How you see entrance of Croatia in the EU», where about 43% of students were indecisive on the question.
^12	  Similar statement gave Bagić and Šalinović (2006).
^13	  Čulig & Kufrin & Landripet (2007) accentuated regional differences by noting that there is more affirmative stance about the entrance in continental part of Croatia (especially Region of Zagreb and Slavonia) and that there are more eurosceptic tendencies in coastal parts of Croatia. Their conclusions are also comparable with conclusions in this research in noting the strong correlation between the parents level of education and students eurosceptic stances.  This local survey confirmes specific findings of those authors in indispensable way, connecting all researches in Croatia in one plausible conclusion. 
^14	  The example is project Istria Communicating Europe (ICE) in the framework of programme “Europe for citizens”.
